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ABSTRACT
Safety culture refers to the attitudes, behaviors, and conditions that affect safety
performance and often arises in discussions following incidents at nuclear power plants.
As it involves both operational and management issues, safety culture is a sensitive topic
for regulators whose role is to ensure compliance with safety requirements and not to
intervene in management decisions. This report provides an overview of proposed safety
culture attributes and worldwide approaches to safety culture assessment and identifies
those attributes that should be of high priority to a regulator deciding to assess safety
culture.
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1. Introduction
Safety culture often arises in discussions following incidents at nuclear power plants.
Although no single definition of safety culture is universally accepted, it commonly
refers to the attitudes, behaviors, and conditions that affect safety performance. It is well
known that human factors play a large role in safe plant operation, but safety culture still
poses a challenge for regulatory bodies. The role of regulators is to oversee licensee
operations to ensure that licensees comply with safety requirements and not to intervene
in management decisions until a serious incident has occurred or is imminent. The
licensees retain full responsibility for safe operation of their plants. Safety culture is a
sensitive issue for the regulator because it is cross-cutting, involving both operational and
management issues. If regulators were to be more proactive toward safety culture, as
some critics suggest they should be, regulators would have to focus on those attributes of
safety culture that are performance-based in order to avoid undue interference in licensee
management.
The objective of this project is to provide an overview of proposed safety culture
attributes and worldwide approaches to safety culture assessment and to identify those
attributes that should be of high priority to a regulator if it chooses to proactively assess
safety culture.
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2. Historical perspectives on 'safety culture'
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) began to formally address the
human factors of safe plant operation after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. In its
post-accident investigation report, the NRC concluded that a large contributor to nuclear
accidents had previously been overlooked. "The one theme that runs through the
conclusions we have reached is that the principal deficiencies in commercial reactor
safety today are not hardware problems, they are management problems [1]." The report
also acknowledged that the NRC had virtually ignored areas such as operator training,
human factors engineering, and technical qualifications in overseeing its licensees.
To remedy this lack of oversight, the NRC first established the Human Factors Program
to minimize human errors in plant designs, procedures, operations, and maintenance. The
objective of the program was to review human factors programs of the licensees applying
for construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certification, combined
licenses, and license amendments. Later, the NRC established the Division of Human
Factors Safety in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Human
Factors Branch within the Division of Risk Analysis in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research (RES). These offices became responsible for addressing human factors issues in
operator licensing, procedures, human-system interface, training, staffing, and
management. Several NUREG documents were subsequently issued to provide human
factors-related guidance based on the NRC's findings [2, 3].
The term "safety culture" was not introduced until after the Chernobyl accident in 1986.
The ensuing investigation concluded that management attitude was a significant
contributor to the chain of events leading to the accident [4]. The International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), an advisory group to the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated in its post-accident report [5] that,
"The vital conclusion drawn is the importance of placing complete authority and
responsibility for the safety of the plant on a senior member of the operational staff of the
plant. Formal procedures, properly reviewed and approved, must be supplemented by the
creation and maintenance of a 'nuclear safety culture."'
INSAG-3 [6] named safety culture among the fundamental management principles along
with the responsibilities of the operating organization and the provision of regulatory
control and verification of safety-related activities. "The phrase 'safety culture' refers to a
very general matter, the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged
in any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants."
A formal definition, however, was not developed until INSAG-4 [7]:
Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and
individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.
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This particular definition was deliberately constructed, the report stated, "to emphasize
that Safety Culture is attitudinal as well as structural, relates both to organizations and
individuals, and concerns the requirement to match all safety issues with appropriate
perceptions and action." It also theorizes that a successful safety culture requires both
commitment and competence at all levels of the organization to ensure that "all duties
important to safety are carried out correctly, with alertness, due thought and full
knowledge, sound judgment, and a proper sense of accountability." INSAG-4 concedes
that "such matters are generally intangible," but argues that tangible manifestations still
result and may be used to assess the underlying cause. INSAG begins with this
assumption that the intangible attributes lead naturally to tangible characteristics of a
strong safety culture without offering evidence. The body of the report expands on the
practical value of the concept and then enumerates 143 questions to be used for
evaluating the effectiveness of safety culture in a particular case.
Also omitted from the report is any specific direction on how to use these questions to
judge whether a particular safety culture is acceptable. The IAEA's succeeding
publication, titled "ASCOT Guidelines (Assessment of Safety Culture in Organizations
Team Guidelines)" [8], suffered the same exclusion. The ASCOT guidelines were written
to serve as a test of a particular safety culture against the principles put forth in INSAG-4.
The guidelines offer an expanded version of the questions listed in the appendix of
INSAG-4 and key indicators that are intended to illustrate what is considered a sound
safety culture. The assessment guidelines assert that in order to accurately assess a safety
culture, all organizations that influence it must be considered, namely the regulator and
utility headquarters in addition to the plant itself. The guidelines do not offer any
instruction on how to draw a conclusion from the answers to the questions, but simply
advise that the review team's report should "highlight any areas in which safety culture
could be strengthened" and "... avoid any suggestions of grading, rating, or
comparison..." One critic points out that a facility with a poor safety culture might be left
with an overwhelming list of corrective actions and no guidance on how to proceed [9].
Several years later, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), an agency of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), published a pair of policy papers [10,
11] which suggested that a nuclear plant's regulatory body may be best suited to guide a
plant with safety performance problems toward a healthier safety culture. The first of the
two papers, "The Role of the Nuclear Regulator in Promoting and Evaluating Safety
Culture," outlined the dual role of the regulatory body as both the model of a strong
safety culture and the evaluator of the culture of its licensees through performance- or
process-based inspections. The following report explored different regulatory response
strategies for addressing a nuclear power plant with safety-performance problems that
could indicate a declining safety culture.
The IAEA did not disengage itself from the topic of safety culture in the following years.
In 1999, it issued INSAG-13 [12], "...to build upon the ideas outlined in 75-INSAG-4
and to develop a set of universal features for an effective safety management system in
order to develop a common understanding," and INSAG-12 to revise the first safety
culture report, INSAG-3.
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Although INSAG introduced and defined the term 'safety culture' for the nuclear
industry, it did not offer an explanation of why it chose those particular words. Schein
[13] formally defines culture as "a pattern of basic assumptions-invented, discovered or
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problem of external adaptation
(how to survive) and internal integration (how to stay together)-which have evolved
over time and are handed down from one generation to the next." His simplified version
is "the way we do things around here." Schein contends that culture dictates what we pay
attention to, what things mean, and what actions to take when. A culture is not simply an
inherent quality of a group, however; it is something learned from a long history of
shared experiences.
Schein models culture in three levels: artifacts and behavior, espoused values, and basic
assumptions. Artifacts and behaviors are the most observable aspects of a culture; they
include everything that can be seen, heard, or felt. Performance indicators would be
found among artifacts and behaviors. This level does not, however, offer any explanation
of why things appear the way they do. Espoused values are those values that people say
they support. There can be inconsistencies between artifacts and espoused values. Basic
assumptions are more difficult to ascertain. These assumptions are fundamental beliefs,
engrained in the subconscious of a cultural group, which reflect, in the case of an
organization, its history, the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the founders, and the key
leaders who have made it successful [14]. Schein reflects on the leader's role, "...one
could argue that the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage
culture..."
Bridges [15] is wary of borrowing the term 'culture' from anthropologists and using it in
the context of an organization. He warns not to assume that a so-called organizational
culture even exists, much less can be reasonably defined and then altered.
Collins [16], on the other hand, argues that the term itself is not the problem, but how it is
defined. He proposes that safety culture is what influences organizational culture and
human performance and that leadership expectations and behaviors are responsible for
influencing safety culture. He redefines safety culture to be a leadership attitude that
ensures a hazardous technology is managed ethically to ensure that individuals and the
environment are not harmed.
Using safety to modify culture implies that safety culture is a subset of a greater plant
culture. Apostolakis and Wu [17] question this partition. "When the subject is culture, we
must question the wisdom of separating safety culture from the culture that exists with
respect to normal plant operation and power production. The dependencies between
them are much stronger because they are due to common work processes and
organizational factors."
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3. Attributes of safety culture
Once the importance of safety culture had been realized, attention within the research
community turned to studying the building blocks, or attributes, of safety culture in an
effort to learn how safety culture affected human performance.
3.1 Previous studies on safety culture attributes
Varying terminology causes some confusion on the subject. Researchers, industry, and
regulators use the terms attributes, principles, characteristics, symptoms, and factors
when describing the various aspects of safety culture. Each has a slightly different
connotation, and the lists of these elements are compiled to serve different purposes.
Despite these differences, the literature on this topic can be generally grouped into two
categories: the causes/contributors, which are usually described as factors or attributes,
and the effects of safety culture, which are usually listed as characteristics or symptoms.
3.1.1 Organizational factors that affect safety performance
In 1991, Haber et al. [18] sought statistically valid relationships between organizational
factors and safety performance using an organizational processes approach. The approach
consisted of three parts: describe the human organization of a nuclear power plant,
identify the organizational and management functions and process related to safety
performance, and develop methods for measuring organizational and management
factors. Through studies at one fossil power plant and one nuclear power plant, five
organizational factors affecting safety performance were identified: communication,
organizational culture; decisionmaking; standardization of work processes; and
management attention, involvement, and oversight.
Jacobs et al. 1-19] developed a similar categorical list in 1993: culture, administrative
knowledge, communications, decisionmaking, and human resource allocation. Jacobs,
however, expounded on this list and created twenty organizational factors that fell into
those five categories. The latter list was included in a joint paper by Jacobs and Haber
that was published the following year [20]:
Centralization Intradepartmental Personnel selection
Coordination of work communication Problem identification
External communication Organizational culture Resource Allocation
Formalization Organizational knowledge Roles and responsibilities
Goal setting/Prioritization Organizational learning Safety culture
Interdepartmental Ownership Time urgency
communication Performance evaluation Training
Performance quality
Weil and Apostolakis [21] attempted to identify the most important organizational factors
from Jacobs and Haber' s list of twenty by doing root-cause analyses on a number of real
incidents to understand how an organization works and what can go wrong. Their
objective was to reduce the list to a more manageable size by eliminating those factors
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that do not greatly impact performance, in order to increase the efficiency of the incident
investigation methodology. They were able to condense Jacobs and Haber's list of
organizational factors to the list of six identified in Table 1.
Table 1. Important organizational factors specified by Weil and Apostolakis [18].
Organizational Definition
factors
Communication Refers to the exchange of information, both formal and informal
Formalization Refers to the extent to which there are well-identified rules,
procedures and/or standardized methods for routine activities and
unusual occurrences
Goal prioritization Refers to the extent to which plant personnel acknowledge and
follow the stated goals of the organization and the appropriateness
of those goals
Problem Refers to the extent to which plant personnel use their knowledge to
identification identify potential problems
Roles and Refers to the degree to which work activities are clearly defined and
responsibilities the degree to which plant personnel carry out those work activities
Technical Refers to the depth and breadth of requisite understanding that plant
knowledge personnel have regarding plant design and systems, and the
phenomena and events that bear on the safe and reliable operation of
the plant
Weil and Apostolakis used a work process approach to reduce the list to these six factors.
They narrowed their list by identifying which work tasks each factor influenced and how
frequently their influence resulted in errors. Safety culture, organizational culture, and
organizational learning were removed from the list because they were too general, not
because they were not seen as important factors influencing performance. Weil and
Apostolakis did not see a need to distinguish between external, interdepartmental, and
intradepartmental communications. Resource allocation and time urgency were
eliminated from the list because they were seen to be dictated largely by goal
prioritization. Technical knowledge was seen to encompass training. Lastly, ownership
was lumped together with problem identification. Although a sense of ownership may
improve problem identification, it is not mandatory and may be out of the control of plant
management.
Donald and Canter performed a study to examine organizational factors relating to safety
in the chemical industry [22]. They developed a list of factors from relevant literature and
expert judgment and then tested those proposed attributes empirically using an employee
survey. The survey examined three facets of safety attitude: people, attitude behavior, and
activity. The facets were then divided into elements, and the results of the survey were
used to measure worker attitudes toward safety and their perception of other people's
attitudes. These attitudes showed "a clear and strong relationship" with self-reported
accident rates.
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Regulators have also identified organizational factors that influence safety performance.
In a state-of-the-art report in 1999 [23], the NEA held a Workshop on Organizational
Factors Identification and Assessment and invited 28 participants from member countries
and Russia who represented utilities, regulatory bodies, and the academic community.
From the operating experience gained from a number of significant operating events
world-wide, the members of the Workshop agreed on twelve organizational factors that
contribute to plant safety performance: external influences; goals and strategies;
management functions and overview; resource allocation; human resource management;
training; coordination of work; organizational knowledge; proceduralization;
organizational culture; organizational learning; and communication. Most of these are
incorporated into Jacobs and Haber's more extensive list.
3.1.2 Symptoms of declining safety performance and safety culture
Another approach to analyzing safety culture is to identify symptoms, or characteristics,
of strong or weak safety culture/performance. Rather than pinpointing the root cause of
an incident, the purpose of identifying safety culture symptoms is to recognize declining
safety performance before a significant accident occurs. These lists usually do not
attempt to be exhaustive but simply offer suggestions and give readers a better idea of
what the concept of 'safety culture' entails.
One of the most recent attempts by IAEA to list characteristics of safety culture was in a
report published in 2002 [14]. Their report approached safety culture with Schein's three
level model of culture. Most characteristics are classified as artifacts, which are the
easiest to identify but the most difficult to interpret. Examples of characteristics at the
artifacts level are quality of documentation and procedures, absence of safety versus
production conflict, and sufficient and competent staff. Less abundant are those
characteristics that fall under the espoused values category and the basic assumptions
category. Characteristics at these levels include a 'safety can always be improved'
mentality and view of mistakes as learning opportunities.
A slightly earlier report empirically examined some proposed safety culture attributes at
the British Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant [24]. These safety culture attributes were
developed from a short list of characteristics of plants with good safety records: high
level of communication; good organizational learning; strong focus on safety; strong
commitment to safety by senior management; democratic, cooperative, humanistic
management leadership style; more and better quality training; clean, comfortable
working conditions; high job satisfaction; and workforce retention is related to working
safely. The list of attributes developed from these common characteristics [Appendix] is
primarily attributes of worker safety attitudes (satisfaction with, perception of, and
confidence in safety-related issues). These proposed attributes were tested with an
evaluation process involving both focus groups and an employee questionnaire.
Compared to the self-reported rate of accidents which caused at least three days of missed
work, a very high statistical correlation was found with 15 of the 19 factors.
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Industry itself has also tried to describe the essential attributes of a healthy nuclear safety
culture. One of the most recent efforts is the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations'
(INPO) "Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture" [25] in which it lists eight
principles, which, it says, if embraced, will influence values, assumptions, experiences,
behaviors, beliefs, and norms. Some of these principles appear on other lists of
characteristics, such as 'Trust permeates the organization' and 'Decision-making reflects
safety first.' One principle that is unique to INPO's list is 'Nuclear is recognized as
different,' which it expands into several more familiar characteristics such as 'activities
are governed by high-quality processes and procedures' and 'equipment is meticulously
maintained well within design requirements.' Other industry efforts to characterize safety
culture were made by the Utility Service Alliance [26] and the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) [27].
3.2 Fundamental safety culture attributes
Despite the differences in terminology and approach, many of the attributes listed are
fundamentally the same. The goal here was to isolate a limited number of frequently
agreed upon safety culture attributes that constitute the basis of safety culture. The
isolated attributes were management commitment to safety, learning culture, roles and
responsibilities, problem identification, technical knowledge, and communication. Of
these attributes, problem identification and learning culture may provide performance
based indicators for regulatory monitoring.
3.2.1 Selection of attributes
Many safety culture attributes, described as organizational factors or characteristics of
safety culture, are listed by researchers, utilities, and regulators in their discussions of
safety culture. Sometimes they are essentially describing the same attribute, just with
different wording; in many cases they are just very closely related. The attributes were
reduced to a list of the most important based on the frequency with which they were cited
and their effect on other aspects of safety.
The process to determine the most frequently cited attributes consisted of three steps.
Eleven lists of possible safety culture attributes were selected. The attributes used
included those discussed earlier as well as several presented at the Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Safety Culture Workshop [28-30]. All attributes were
listed together to look for exact matches. Organizational management and self-
assessment were two that appeared frequently at this stage. The matching requirements
were then loosened to include attributes, which, subjectively, described the same thing.
An example of this reduction were the two separately listed attributes 'risk insights in
decision making' and 'appreciation of risks'. In a different situation, if a single list cited
two attributes which were seemingly the same and subsequently combined, the attribute
was tallied as being listed once by that author. The final step was the removal of any
attribute cited only once. The more frequently cited attributes are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2. More frequently cited safety culture attributes.
ATTRIBUTES I ~ 
Roles/responsibilities/accountabilities X X X X X X X 8
High priority to safety X X X X X X X 7
Openness and communications X X X X X X X 7
Organizational learning X XXXX X X 7
Top management commitment to safety X X X X X X 6
Initial and continuing training X X X X X 5
Employees have a questioning attitude X X X X 4
Recognizing employee's efforts X X X X 4
Appreciation of risks X X X X 4
Self-assessment X X X X 4
Technical competence X X XX 4
Compliance w/regs and procedures X X X 3
Finding problems and fixing them X X X 3
Organizational knowledge X XX 3
Proceduralization X XX 3
Proper resource allocation X X X 3
Working conditions (pressure/workload/stress) X X X 3
Management leadership/oversight X X 2
Organization culture X X 2
Exchanges of info with other plants X X 2
Relationship between managers and employees X X 2
Relationship with regulators X X 2
Role of managers X X 2
Time focus X X 2
The most frequently cited attributes are very similar to those proposed by Weil and
Apostolakis 1-21] in their list of organizational factors reduced by empirical evidence.
Table 3 presents the two lists side-by-side. The first notable difference between the lists
is 'organizational learning'. The discussion of the construction of the earlier list
acknowledges that "...organizational learning may be [one of] the most important factors
influencing performance," but it was excluded because it was viewed to be "too far-
reaching to provide the plant much benefit when cited in an investigation."
Organizational learning is changed to learning culture and given a very narrow meaning
in order to improve its usefulness if identified as a plant weakness. The final list also
adopts problem identification from the earlier list and defines it as a combination of
'employees have a questioning attitude' and 'finding problems and fixing them.' 'Goal
prioritization' on the first list is closely related to 'management commitment to safety' on
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the second list. If safety is a top priority of the management team, then it will be
committed to safety; therefore, these two attributes were combined in the final list.
Technical knowledge appears on both lists but is more widely defined on the second to
include training. A final observation is the absence of formalization on the second list.
Proceduralization, closely related to formalization, was not among the most frequently
cited attributes; this may indicate that proceduralization is dependant on other attributes,
such as commitment to safety and communication, rather than a direct contributor to
safety culture.
Table 3. Comparison of reduced organizational factors and important safety culture attributes
Reduced organizational factors Important safety culture attributes
Communication Communication
Formalization Learning Culture
Goal Prioritization Management Commitment to Safety
Problem Identification Problem Identification
Roles and Responsibilities Roles and Responsibilities
Technical Knowledge Technical Knowledge
The next step in reducing all proposed attributes to a list of just the most important ones
was to examine the dependence of one attribute on another and the contribution of one
attribute to another. This enabled something resembling an attribute hierarchy to be
developed [Figure 1]. 'Management commitment to safety' is placed alone, directly
under safety culture. A strong safety culture cannot exist without it, even if all other
attributes are present. This commitment to safety is the basis of the next five attributes:
technical knowledge, roles and responsibilities, communication, learning culture, and
problem identification. These five are not independent of each other, however. The
arrows in Figure 1 can loosely be interpreted as "...is a good indicator of..." For
example, "Problem identification is a good indicator of technical knowledge."
The bulleted lists associated with each of the six attributes are a collection of all of the
characteristics previously cited that could be associated with the general attribute; almost
all of the characteristics can be categorized. These associated characteristics cannot
necessarily be interpreted as the definition of the attribute.
The attributes are classified into two groups (see the dashed line in Figure 1). One group
of attributes, composed of management commitment to safety, technical knowledge, and
roles and responsibilities, is solely of licensees' responsibility. The other group, problem
identification and learning culture, is more performance-based and would be of interest to
a proactive regulator. Schein's artifacts and behaviors would most likely be indicators of
attributes in this second group. Communication falls on both sides of the line. While
regulators are not concerned with the exchange of information within a plant,
communication between the plant and the regulator is a candidate for a performance-
based indicator.
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3.2.2 Definitions of attributes
Management commitment to safety. If all levels of management are truly committed to
safety, all other safety culture attributes should come naturally. A commitment to safety
means that safety is a top priority and there is no conflict between safety and production.
After all, a safely operating plant will be more likely to continue operating long-term. No
safety risks should be taken to keep the facility running. A committed management will
have a conservative approach to reactor safety. Nuclear power is recognized as being
different than other conventional energy sources, and the associated risks are taken into
account in decisionmaking. This management will also be committed to allocating the
resources needed to ensure safety, whether this is money, time, personnel, or their own
attention. The effect of this management commitment will be timely maintenance and
response to reported problems. A commitment to safety will also be evident in a plant's
compliance with regulations and procedures.
Communication. Communication is an exchange of information on many levels.
Communication begins with individuals and teams working effectively together and then
extends to teams working within a department. The relationship between managers and
employees is also dependent on communication to develop mutual respect and trust,
especially in a hierarchical organization. Employees must have a means to voice their
concerns. A variety of channel options are available for management to communicate
with the employees as well. Openness and access are key elements of communication
among the plants and between the plants and the regulator.
Learning culture. Learning culture simply means a desire to improve and a willingness
to learn from others. In a learning culture, every problem or mistake is an opportunity to
learn. A plant with a learning culture is proactive; it will seek out experience from other
plants and take heed of problems others have encountered first. Total safety is difficult to
achieve, and a plant with a learning culture could be successful in its quest for improved
safety performance. Change is encouraged, and challenging how things are done is a way
of life. Similarly, there is no fatalistic assumption that things are how they are and should
be left alone.
Problem identification. Problem identification has two different parts. First, there is the
ability of workers to use their knowledge to identify potential problems in the plant.
These problems may be in hardware or work processes or in the organization of the plant
itself. The purpose of self-assessments is to identify areas that can be improved. Problem
identification simply means finding the problems wherever they are. This aspect of
problem identification is a skill; the second part is an attitude. Employees must want to
find these problems and be willing to report them and raise their concerns. An
environment which encourages a questioning attitude is sometimes called a safety
conscious work environment (SCWE). A corollary of SCWE is a blame-free work
environment in the whistleblower is not punished and the worker who made the mistake
is not unfairly blamed. The focus is on identifying and correcting the mistake.
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Roles and responsibilities. 'Roles' refers to how clearly work activities are defined and
to what degree personnel carry out those work activities. Responsibility is then divided
among those roles. If done properly, there should not be any confusion. Accountability is
also part of roles and responsibilities. Accountability means that people are evaluated on
their performance and there will be consequences for good and bad results both for
individuals and the organization.
Technical knowledge. Technical knowledge is the foundation of competent personnel.
Safety risk increases if workers do not have the skill set for the tasks they are expected to
perform on a daily basis and in emergency situations. Technical knowledge is an ongoing
process. Employees need a solid background in the fundamentals of their jobs, training
on the specific duties of their job just before taking over those responsibilities, and
supplemental training as a refresher and as new experience is gained in the field.
3.3 Important attributes in operational experience
Recent operational experiences have emphasized the importance of these six safety
culture attributes. Several of these incidents occurred in US plants. The freshest memory
is the late discovery of the degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head (RPV) in the
Davis-Besse nuclear plant. The conclusion of the NRC's Incident Investigation Team was
that Davis-Besse had failed to adequately review, assess, and follow up on relevant
operating experience [31]. Engineers and regulators alike were aware of the potential
problem-- reactor vessel corrosion due to boric acid was also seen in 1987 at Turkey
Point Unit 4. However, a learning culture did not exist at Davis-Besse, and future
inspections failed to detect the progressing degradation. Only when a separate problem,
circumferential cracking of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, was detected
at Oconee were other plants with high susceptibility asked to shut down for more in-
depth inspections. FENOC requested that Davis-Besse be allowed to delay the shut down
until its next scheduled outage in March 2002.
Other plants are also receiving unwanted attention from the public because of safety
culture related problems. At Indian Point 2, communication problems and inadequate
procedures were cited as contributing factors to the manual reactor trip following steam
generator tube failure. The investigation into a boron dilution event at the same plant
found a skipped step in procedure and a lack of clarity in the leader in the evolution [32].
In addition to these problems, four of seven operating crews failed the requalification
operational exam. Millstone also had to address safety culture problems when all three of
their plants were shut down for an extended period in 1996. Among the root causes
identified were a loss of trust in plant leadership and a lack of understanding of safety
culture [33]. Wolf Creek found a weakness in its problem identification ability following
an analysis of a drain-down event. Among the contributing management and
organizational factors were heavy dependence on the control room to identify problems
and poor mental models of systems and valves. Problem identification and corrective
action were also cited during an incident in 1996 [34].
18
Plants outside the U.S. have also cited safety culture attributes as contributors to
significant operating events. Germany's Philippsburg 2 was shut down by regulators
after discovering the cover-up of emergency borated water management issues. First,
operators failed to identify a problem with a valve and, then, that oversight was dismissed
as a "human factor incident" and went unreported to regulators [35]. Plant management's
first response to irregularities in borated water shortly after restart was to ignore them.
Regulators also challenged the management's commitment to safety at Brunsbuettel
when indicators of an auxiliary coolant pipe rupture were allegedly deliberately
overlooked until the next scheduled outage.
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Canada's nuclear industry have also been
accused of lacking a learning culture for inadequately addressing the potential for a loss-
of-coolant accident (LOCA) from stress corrosion cracking. It was assumed that a LOCA
would not occur because a leak would be seen before a break. A second failure occurred
just three months later [36].
Japan has also found unhealthy safety cultures in some of its plants. Among the
problems was a systematic cover-up in inspection reports of 13 reactors; one employee
said this had been the practice since the late 1980s. Lack of technical knowledge
contributed to the root cause of the Tokaimura accident in which poorly trained
employees in improper attire using an illegal process added seven times too much
uranium to a purification tank containing nitric acid, starting the nuclear chain reaction.
Poor communication made the situation worse. Local authorities were not notified
immediately and then were slow to issue the evacuation order. The Science and
Technology Agency also received part of the blame because the facility did not have any
official procedures for handling a criticality accident (Tokaimura is a fuel processing
plant, not a power plant) [37].
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4. Assessment of safety culture
Once the importance of safety culture is recognized and its essential attributes are
identified, the next step in improvement is to assess the current strength of a particular
safety culture. The discussion about safety culture assessment centers around two
questions: 'How can an assessment be done fairly and correctly?' and 'Who should be
responsible for conducting these assessments?' Industry and regulatory bodies worldwide
have taken steps toward assessing various aspects of safety culture.
4.1 Industry initiatives
In the wake of the March 2002 Davis-Besse incident, the safety culture assessment
method of the plant's utility, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) [38], is
probably under the most scrutiny. FENOC began its own evaluation of the safety culture
of the plant several months after the incident. In August 2002, FENOC conducted an
Employee Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey. Shortly after that, an
independent review of Davis-Besse safety culture was conducted and determined the root
cause of the RPV head degradation to be a less-than-adequate nuclear safety focus among
plant management.
In response, FENOC developed a safety culture model adapted from that of the IAEA
[14]. The model breaks safety culture into three areas of focus: individual commitment,
plant management commitment, and policy- or corporate-level commitment. The
individual commitment includes qualities such as drive for excellence, rigorous work
control, and nuclear professionalism as well as two attributes frequently cited by other
organizations, a questioning attitude and open communications. Commitment at the plant
management level also includes attributes that appeared near the top of the frequently
cited table: a commitment to safety, ownership and accountability, and a commitment to
continuous improvement. The policy or corporate level commitments appear to be less
attitudinal and more action-oriented.
FENOC also developed a method to assess the strength of its organization in each
commitment area by identifying attributes related to each category associated with it. The
attributes usually could be evaluated quantitatively and a color coded rating would be
assigned. For example, Program and Process Error Rate was identified as an attribute
related to a questioning attitude (within the individuals' commitment area), and the
attribute was given a rating based on how many program and process errors occurred per
10,000 hours worked. Other examples of attributes related to a questioning attitude were
management observations and field observations of individuals' willingness to raise
problems encountered in the field and the quality of pre-job briefs.
Based on the results of this assessment and other independent recommendations, FENOC
took many actions to improve safety culture. Among the initiatives at the policy- or
corporate-level was a strengthened Employees Concerns Program, the establishment of a
Safety Conscious Work Environment Policy, and the creation of an Executive Vice
President - Engineering position. At the policy making level, a new, proven Senior
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Management Team was appointed, and managers established an Engineering Assessment
Board and revised competencies in the appraisal process to include nuclear
professionalism and nuclear safety consciousness. Many of the improvements at the
individual level concerned training and re-qualifications and improved communication
methods. All of these actions were part of the Management and Human Performance
Excellence Plan, one of seven elements in FENOC's Return to Service Plan to get Davis-
Besse "back, better, and beyond."
The Utility Service Alliance, keeping in line with its strategic objective to improve
station operational safety and effectiveness, also developed an assessment method to
uncover any of the same weaknesses/symptoms that existed at Davis-Besse at its seven
member power stations [22]. The Utility Service Alliance devised its assessment strategy
using guidance from many sources. Among other INPO recommendations, the Utility
Service Alliance utilized Principles for Effective Operational Decision-making, Warning
Flags from Recent Extended Shutdowns, Safety Focus During Changing Times, and
Principles for Effective Self-assessments and Corrective Action Programs. USA also
reviewed insight gained from Davis-Besse 0350 Panel public meetings and Davis-Besse
root cause evaluations. The Alliance also borrowed a credible survey from the NEI [41]
which posed twenty-one questions in four areas: safety conscious work environment,
employee concerns program, management conduct and performance, and corrective
action process.
The assessment method developed by the Utility Service Alliance involves a list of
interview questions and a scoring matrix. One of the attributes being assessed might be
"Conditions that potentially challenge safe, reliable operation are recognized and
promptly reported for resolution." Behaviors associated with this attribute are a)
ensuring personnel are knowledgeable and understand safety expectations, including
design and licensing bases, b) ensuring personnel are aware of proper equipment or
system operation and trends, and c) ensuring personnel maintain a questioning attitude. A
question in the interview question bank will specifically pertain to one of these behaviors
such as "Does the station have trending program to assist in the identification of
repetitive equipment issues?" Based on the answer to the question, the associated
behavior is then scored according to the following criteria: (1) needs much improvement,
(2) needs some improvement, (3) competent, (4) strength, or (5) exceptional. Separate
lists of questions are developed for different divisions within the plant (senior/middle
management, engineering, operations, etc.), and the scores are posted for employee
review. Average scores below three indicate warning flags.
As of June 2003, the Utility Service Alliance was able to demonstrate some success with
its new assessment method through Site Assessment Reports that had been developed for
five of their member plants. Strengths and areas in need of improvement had been
identified in each plant. Though all of the five averaged an approximately 'competent'
score, encouragingly, the Utility Service Alliance method was able to discern levels of
safety culture at the plants by comparing quantities of warning flags.
INPO states that safety culture is fundamental to its mission, but its own approach to
assessing safety culture is not as developed or prescriptive as that of the Utility Service
21
Alliance. Though not necessarily by that name, INPO says, "safety focus," "deep respect
for the core," and "reactivity management" are its motivation for focusing on functional
issues like operations, maintenance, and engineering. INPO defines safety culture as
"that set of attributes that results in nuclear safety being the overriding priority at the
station."
The philosophy behind INPO's approach to assessing nuclear safety is that if a safety
culture is unhealthy, it will show up in symptoms. Some of the symptoms INPO uses
were frequently cited by others such as how comfortable the plant staff is in raising
problems and how risk is measured and managed. Other symptoms may be detectable in
plant records, such as whether safety systems are unavailable longer than need be and
whether modifications that are installed adequately consider the margin-to-safety. These
and other symptoms will be identified by a team of professionals with broad experience.
Following the Davis-Besse incident, INPO wrote its own significant operating event
report and developed several recommendations both for the plants and itself [40]. To the
plants it recommended (1) that all members of the management team participate in a case
study discussion, (2) that each plant perform a self-assessment of safety culture, and (3)
that the plants identify and document long term unexplained conditions. INPO also
learned that it needs to better recognize and more openly address safety focus and
improve its ability to uncover the organizational factors that detract from a strong safety
culture. It is currently in the process of developing a safety culture task force which will
incorporate industry and international input.
4.2 International regulatory bodies
One of the first regulatory bodies to formally acknowledge the importance of safety
culture in its regulation was the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Finnish experts also participated in drafting INSAG-4, in which the now generally
accepted definition of safety culture was first proposed. Safety culture was included in
Finnish regulation in 1991 as Section 4 of the "General Regulations for the Safety of
Nuclear Power Plants." According to the legislation, STUK is responsible for setting
safety requirements and verifying compliance of the four Finnish reactors. For this end,
STUK has developed a set of safety guides known as the YVL-guides. The guides give
instructions and recommendations on all areas of nuclear power plant operation,
including general safety principles, personnel qualification and training, utilization of
operational experience, and inspections and safety assessments.
Shortly after the legislation was enacted, STUK prepared Safety Evaluation Memoranda
for each of its power plants in which many of the important safety culture attributes were
addressed, including the following:
· Past management decisions where it had been necessary to make a choice
between shutting down a plant for safety concerns or continuing operations
and taking action later.
· Resources invested in maintaining a high level of safety.
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C· o-operation and information exchange between organizational units.
· Methods for maintaining and upgrading plant personnel's professional skills
and knowledge.
· Openness in uncovering and solving problems.
STUK also included an evaluation of safety culture strength as part of renewing the
operating licenses of the plants in 1998. The evaluation was based on self assessments as
well as STUK' s own observations of safety culture attributes. Other initiatives for the
regulator to interact with the plants on safety culture issues are periodic "Safety
Management" inspections, quality assurance audits, and root cause analyses. Licensee
senior plant managers also meet annually with STUK to discuss their findings related to
safety culture. In 1999, STUK established the "Human and Organizational Factors" unit
within the Department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to further safety culture oversight
[24].
Canada has also decided to actively review licensees' safety cultures. The Atomic
Energy Control Board (AECB), which existed until 1999 when the Nuclear Safety and
Control Act created the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), decided that the
newly realized importance of safety culture justified a proactive approach and sought to
develop a systematic, objective process for assessing the licensees' organization and
management. AECB's philosophy was that if the organization and management
foundation of a plant was flawed, then potentially serious problems existed in the entire
defense-in-depth system.
The ultimate goal was to develop a method to assess licensees' organization and
management systems and processes as a standard component of AECB's formal
regulatory process. Several prerequisites for the method were specified, notably that
assessments use objective measures yet be both quantitative and qualitative to fairly
obtain an accurate understanding of the situation at the plant. Another early concern was
that the method must focus clearly on safety requirements and not dictate a particular
management philosophy. The factors the method would assess were also pre-determined
using Jacobs and Haber's organizational factors. The model used to develop the
assessment method, termed the Canadian Adaptive Machine Model (CAMM), was a
version of the NRC's NOMAC, modified to accommodate the Canadian nuclear
environment
AECB incorporated several previously validated evaluation tools into its method. In
addition to documentation review, surveys, and walk-throughs, the method developers
designed a structured review protocol and built a database of relevant questions to assess
pre-identified issues. The method developed would also utilize behavioral checklists and
behavioral anchored rating scales (BARS) that would allow behavioral examples to be
incorporated with general performance dimensions.
About nine facilities had been evaluated by the new CNSC as of 2003. Evaluations are
labor intensive and require 4-6 inspectors to spend 10-14 days onsite. The licensee in the
field trial reportedly agreed that the process was systematic and resulted in legitimate
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data and an accurate assessment. Other licensees since have expressed some concern
about the regulator's intrusiveness.
Though safety culture is not explicitly part of CNSC's considerations for license renewal,
the commission is given the burden of confirming that the applicant "makes adequate
provision for the protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the
maintenance of national security." To fulfill this mission, the license renewal decision
uses compliance verification activities, safety performance indicators, and review of
safety significant events. Though traditionally a non-prescriptive regulatory body, CNSC
is moving towards more explicit requirements in order to be more predictable and
understandable to industry and the public [24].
The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKi) also takes a non-prescriptive approach to
nuclear safety regulation. Under the Act on Nuclear Activities, the licensees have the full
and undivided responsibility to take all measures necessary to achieve safety. The role of
the SKi is to provide clear definitions of requirements and to supervise compliance with
those requirements largely by focusing on organizational processes and activities. The
associated regulatory strategy gives equal weight to technical and organizational factors
that influence nuclear safety.
An updated set of general safety regulations was issued in 1998 along with general
recommendations on their application. In general, the provisions extended and reinforced
many of the earlier requirements, particularly those related to human factors and
organizational issues. Though the regulations do not make specific safety culture
requirements, there is a focus on the quality of key processes for safety such as ensuring
satisfactory working conditions, ensuring the maintenance of a competent and adequate
staff, conducting safety reviews, and ensuring a systematic analysis of incidents.
The approach for assessing aspects of management functions and oversight was
developed in the SKi Inspection Guidebook-Maintenance in 1994. The method identifies
five resource functions (people, tools, materials, information, and coordination) essential
to effective maintenance programs. It also emphasizes that a program must be viewed as
a system of interrelated elements and activities and goals must be evaluated within each
element. A list of general questions is offered to assist the inspector in his evaluation.
This guidebook is also available to the utilities to use in self-assessments.
SKi conducted an intensive inspection at one site following the identification of several
indicators of deficiencies in safety management. Using a mixed team of inspectors with
backgrounds in plant operation and experts on man-technology-organization interaction,
the inspection also looked into organization and safety culture, self-assessment,
management of human factors, and management training. Feedback of their findings was
given to the managers in meetings on site. The effort was found to be very useful and
SKi decided 1to continue the in-depth inspections at one site per year even without
indicators of declining safety performance [24].
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The U.S. NRC currently does not regulate safety culture. It has, however, taken actions to
provide some guidance to its licensees on safety culture and the development of a SCWE.
In its Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant Operations in January
1989 [41], the Commission includes a sentence reminiscent of the Occupational Safety
and Hazard Act, "Management has the duty and obligation to foster the development of a
"safety culture" at each facility and to provide a professional working environment, in the
control room and throughout the facility, that assures safe operations." In May 1996 the
Commission defined a SCWE, in its Policy Statement on the Freedom of Employees in
the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns without Fear of Retaliation [42], as a work
environment in which "employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both to their
management and to the NRC, without fear of retaliation."
The Commission does, however, attempt to assess safety culture and SCWE through
indirect means. In a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) in 1998 in response to
SECY-98-059 [43], it approved the staff practice of inferring licensee management
performance from routine inspections and event follow-ups, but also eliminated resources
allotted for developing a systematic method for determining management performance.
Similar to INPO's philosophy, the premise of the NRC reactor oversight process is that a
poor safety culture will be evident during baseline inspections. Aspects of safety culture,
such as problem identification are investigated during these inspections. Later that year,
the Commission also approved the assessment of licensee SCWE on an individual basis
but encouraged licensees to use third parties evaluations.
When significant issues are identified, supplemental inspections are also warranted. One
focus of these inspections is licensees' dedication to identifying and correcting the root
cause of performance deficiencies. Plants in an extended shutdown may also be subject to
further inspections focusing on cross-cutting issues that contributed to the plant's
shutdown.
This is where NRC draws the line. On March 26, 2003, the Commission issued an SRM
[44] disapproving a recommendation in SECY-02-0166 for rulemaking with regard to
SCWE. In place of regulation, it requested that a guideline of "best practices" to
encourage a SCWE be developed in consultation with stakeholders. It also directed that
efforts by foreign regulators to develop objective measures that serve as indicators of
possible problems with safety culture as well as efforts to regulate safety culture be
monitored. The NRC has not developed any performance indicators or other inspection
tools of its own that are used routinely during inspections.
4.3 Obstacles to safety culture assessment
Safety culture assessment is a complex matter for both the utilities and the regulators.
Much of the hesitancy of the NRC and other regulatory bodies is not due to a lack of
recognition of its important role in the safe operation of a nuclear power plant but the
obstacles and consequences involved. One fundamental question is 'Who should be
performing safety culture assessments?' The mission of the NRC is to protect the public
health and safety and the environment from the effects of radiation from nuclear reactors,
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materials, and waste facilities. However, the plants maintain full responsibility for safe
operation. These roles cause some confusion as to who is responsible for assessing safety
culture. Assessment and inspections by the regulator are very closely linked to
regulations and requirements. Industry argues that safety culture regulations would mean
interference in management and points out that if the licensees are to be ultimately
responsible, they must have some say in the way safety is ensured.
A second argument against safety culture regulation is that safety culture initiatives are
most effective when generated by the utility itself. A study on human factors in the
United Kingdom found that the "most impressive achievements appear in companies
where the pressure for safety has been generated within the organization, apparently
independent of external standards." Assessment and regulation of safety culture by the
regulator may discourage licensees from self-assessment and seeking continuous
improvement in safety standards.
Regardless of who is doing the assessment, the greatest obstacle is figuring out how to
assess safety culture correctly and fairly. A common complaint about how aspects of
safety culture are currently inspected today is that the methods are not objective.
Different inspectors acting in accordance with some current methods can come to
different conclusions about the state of a particular safety culture. If this is so, plants
cannot be expected to act on the feedback they receive, and prospective regulation could
not be enforced. Data collection via surveys is also subjective as is its interpretation.
Some argue that objective methods to assess safety culture are not possible because
safety culture itself is a matter of attitudes.
If objective methods to assess the important safety culture attributes were found, the
debate over their usefulness would still continue. While indicators would allow a
detection of safety performance trends, they could only be an indirect measurement of
safety culture. The consequences of using the indicators would also be an issue. If
managers know what is being measured, they will undoubtedly focus their attention on
improving their performance on those indicators. For example, if the indicator is the ratio
of number of maintenance problems identified by the plant compared to the number
identified by inspectors, the number of maintenance problems reported (big or small) is
likely to increase. Managers want the plant to have successful ratios, so they encourage
maintenance workers to include trivial findings in their reports. A large gain in the ratio
may not necessarily correspond to great improvements in safety culture. This leads to
another question-once an indicator is used to measure safety culture, will the
assessment be valid if it is used again? Many questions stand in the way of a successful
assessment of a plant's important safety culture attributes.
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5. Conclusion
Safety culture is not a new topic of discussion in the nuclear power industry; it dates back
to the TMI accident in 1979. Twenty-five years later it is more important than ever.
Despite technological advancements, accidents and close misses still occur in nuclear
plants. One recent reminder of the importance of safety culture was the 2002 Davis-Besse
pressure vessel head degradation.
Although safety culture definitions vary, there is some consensus as to its fundamental
attributes. Some approach the subject by examining organizational factors that cause
changes in safety performance and some look at characteristics of plants with good
records of safe operation. Six attributes (and variations thereof) are frequently cited:
management commitment to safety, technical knowledge, roles and responsibilities,
communication, problem identification, and learning culture. This consensus suggests
that these attributes should be considered by those devising strategies to enhance safety
culture. However, not all of these attributes would be appropriate for assessment by
regulators.
Successful safety culture assessment must overcome many obstacles. Utilities and
regulators alike are struggling to create objective methods to measure something that by
its very nature is subjective. Many regulatory bodies to-date have chosen not to directly
inspect or regulate the safety culture of their licensees. If in light of the operating
experience, a regulator chooses to become more proactive in licensee safety culture, the
first step will be to devise performance-based indicators able to warn of declining safety
performance. Problem identification and learning culture would be good places to begin.
27
Appendix: Safety culture attributes from previous studies
Author
Jacobs and Haber
Nuclear Energy Agency
Weil and Apostolakis
Proposed safety culture characteristics/symptoms and
organizational factors affecting safety performance
Problem identification
Organizational learning
Performance evaluation
Goal prioritization
Resource allocation
Time urgency
Personnel selection
Technical knowledge
Training
Organizational knowledge
External communication
Interdepartmental communication
Intradepartmental communication
Ownership
Roles and responsibilities
Coordination of work
Organizational culture
Safety culture
Centralization
Formalization
External influences
Organizational learning
Goals and strategies
Resource allocation
Training
Organizational knowledge
Human resources management
Communication
Coordination of work
Management functions and overview
Proceduralization
Organizational culture
Communication
Formalization
Goal prioritization
Problem identification
Roles and responsibilities
Technical knowledge
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Lee
International Atomic Energy
Agency
High level of communication
Good organizational learning
Strong focus on safety
Strong senior management commitment to safety
Democratic, cooperative, humanistic management
leadership style
More and better quality training
Clean, comfortable working conditions
High job satisfaction
Workforce retention is related to working safely
Employees have a questioning attitude
Handling of conflict
Involvement of all employees
Organizational learning
Self-assessment
Measurement of safety performance
View of mistakes
Safety can always be improved
Top management commitment to safety
Absence of safety versus production conflict
Man, technology, and organization knowledge
Proper resource allocation
Compliance with regulations and procedures
Strategic business importance of safety
High priority to safety
Sufficient and competent staff
Good working conditions (time pressure/ workload/stress)
Quality of documentation and procedures
Systematic approach to safety
Motivation and job satisfaction
Good housekeeping
Awareness of work process
Visible leadership
Collaboration and teamwork
Relationship to regulators and other external groups
Relationship between managers and employees
Openness and communications
Clear roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities
View of safety
Role of managers
Proactive and long term perspective
Time focus
Management of change
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Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations
Nuclear Energy Institute
(Dugger)
Donald and Canter
Murley (Safety Consultant)
Nuclear safety is everyone's responsibility
Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety
Trust permeates the organization
Decision-making reflects safety first
Nuclear is recognized as different
A "what" if approach is cultivated
Organizational learning is embraced
Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination
Operate the plant safely
Maintaining equipment in top working order
Finding problems and fixing them
Recognizing employee's efforts
Being self-critical
Communicating effectively
Fostering professionalism
Management commitment
Safety training
Open communications
Environmental control and management
Stable workforce
Positive safety promotion policy
Importance of safety training
Effects of workplace
Status of safety committee
Status of safety officer
Effect of safe conduct on promotion
Level of risk at the workplace
Management attitudes towards safety
Effect of safe conduct on social status
Organizational commitment to the priority of safety
matters
Clear lines of responsibility within the regulatory body
Program of initial and continuing training to maintain
regulatory staff competence
Personal commitment to safety from every staff member
Clear guidance for conducting safety inspections and
reviews
Clear regulatory acceptance criteria
Commitment to regulatory intervention that is
proportionate to the safety implications
Use of risk insights in decision making
Effective plan management
Effective work planning and programs
Self-assessment and quality assurance audits
Clear accountability and responsibility for fixing problems
Management cooperation with regulator
Timely response to regulatory commitments
Participation or exchanges of info with other plants
Participation in industry activities with current
performance
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Whitcomb (Attorney at Law)
Utility Service, Alliance
(O'Connor)
INSAG 15 (as adopted by NRC)
Management leadership
Personnel integrity
Technical competence
Personal reliability
Two-way communications
Safety over production
Management oversight
Rigor staff capability
Problems identified and reported
Independent oversight backed by management
Learning from others
Regulatory compliance
Maintain or improve safety margins
Safety is a clearly recognized value
Accountability for safety is clear
Safety is integrated into all activities
Safety leadership process exists
Safety culture is learning-driven
Not complacent
Non-isolationism
No arrogance
Intrusiveness
Commitment
Use of procedures
Conservative decision Making
Reporting Culture
Challenging unsafe acts
Learning organization
Communications
Clear priorities
Organization
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